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In many economic models, agents are assumed to behave as if they knew
the structure of the model and as if they were perfectly rational utility or
pro t maximizers. Most economists argue that every model must exclude
large part of real world complexity to facilitate the discovery of underly-
ing processes. They furthermore resort to the Friedmanian argument not
to claim that agents really behave this way but that this as-if-assumption
produces correct predictions (Friedman 1953). Other models do not assume
that agents know the model, but that they learn its structure over time (see
Evans and Honkapohja 2001, Marcet and Sargent 1989 ). This branch of the
learning literature explores the conditions under which model assumptions,
learning mechanisms, or formation of expectations lead to Rational Expec-
tations Equilibria. Most microfounded macroeconomic models, however, are
silent about how agents reach the Rational Expectations Equilibrium, which
is the generally applied solution concept in New Classical and New Keynesian
macroeconomics.
We address the fundamental methodological question whether rational
expectations models or more speci cally models with perfectly foresighted
agents really live up to Friedman’s requirement of predicting well what real
subjects do. This issue cuts to the very heart of economic methodology as
these models are common practice in most economic  elds and especially in
macroeconomics. It is notoriously di cult to assess the predictive power of
economic models with  eld data (see e.g. Sutton 2002), which is in fact one
of the most important arguments in favor of economic experiments. Most
economic experiments can be understood as tests of the predictive power
of economic as-if models, and many have produced robust rejections of this
hypothesis1. Our experiment di ers from most of the experimental economic
literature in its focus on market or macroeconomic behavior rather than the
behavior of individuals. So far, only few researcher have used the method of
economic experiments to test macroeconomic models (see Du y 2006 for a
survey).
Many prominent theories from the realm of Macroeconomics might appear
suitable choices for experimental examination. However, in order to examine
the fundamental assumptions of pro t or utility maximization and rational
1Roth (1995) coined the term "speaking to theorists" and sees this class of experiments a
part of a dialogue between theorists and experimenters. While we want to speak to theorists,
there is also an element of "searching for facts" in our experiment.
4expectations one might want to use the simplest textbook-like model. Other-
wise too many auxiliary assumptions might blur the connection between the
fundamental assumptions and the resulting predictions. The only purpose
of this model is to generate predictions derived from the usual assumptions,
which are then tested in the laboratory. Hence our contribution is method-
ological rather than macroeconomic.
One important innovation of our experiment is that we observe both sub-
jects behavior and their perceptions of the economic environment. In addition
to subjects’ actions, we elicit their expectations on which they base their de-
cisions. This allows us to analyze whether potential failures of the model to
predict subjects’ behavior correctly are rooted in misperceptions of the eco-
nomic environment or in subjects’ failures to maximize their payo  functions.
Furthermore, we can analyze if the model makes correct predictions for the
aggregate of subjects, even if it fails for individuals.
Our experiment is related to the work of Lian and Plott (1998), who in-
vestigate whether a full- edged general equilibrium model with production,
trade, and money can be implemented in the laboratory and whether a static
Walrasian general equilibrium model is able to capture what is observed in a
rather complex experimental economy. Lian and Plott also see their exper-
iment as a test of as-if assumptions, most of which are clearly not satis ed.
They  nd that, despite the violation of many assumptions, the data in their
experimental economy converge to the magnitudes predicted by the static
general competitive equilibrium model. There is also some relation to Vernon
Smith’s work on markets as economizers of information (Smith 1982). In his
double auction experiments Smith shows that the predictions of the theory
of competitive markets can be observed in the laboratory, although many of
the theoretical assumptions are not satis ed.
In contrast to Lian and Plott (1998) and Smith (1982), we establish highly
structured markets and use a partial equilibrium setting without the possibil-
ity of disequilibrium. We focus on maximization behavior as a core element
of every modern mainstream model and need both a well-structured bench-
mark model to determine the objective maximization solution and subjects’
perceptions of the model in order to see if they maximize with respect to their
perceived model. We test maximization in an objective version, where the true
underlying model is the benchmark, and a subjective version, which rests on
the beliefs or expectations of subjects. As we observe how subjects form ex-
pectations in a macroeconomic setting, our work also relates to several recent
5experimental studies on expectation formation (Adam 2007, Bernasconi and
Kirchkamp 2000, Bernasconi et al., 2004, Heemeijer et al. 2007, Hommes
et al. 2005a,b, 2007, forthcoming, Sonnemans et al. 2004, 2005). While
the analysis of subjective expectations and their formation process is clearly
important for macroeconomics, it is not the main objective of this paper.
This paper seeks to answer the following research questions. First, how
well does the full information model describe subjects’ behavior and the ob-
served data? This question is in the tradition of Lian and Plott (1998) and
Smith (1982). Second, how do subjects perceive their economic environment?
With this question we complement the theoretical literature on model un-
certainty (see Evans and Honkapohja 2001), which analyzes how subjects’
misperceptions in uence the model equilibria. A common assumption is that
subjects do know the functional forms of relationships between variables, but
do not know the parameters. We want to explore if such an assumption
is justi ed. Third, we ask if behavior is consistent with expectations in that
subjects’ decisions maximize their objective functions for the expressed expec-
tations. In a sense, this research question combines questions 1 and 2. People
might have correct or rational expectations, but do not optimize which would
lead to deviations from the model’s predictions. The experimental literature
on expectations usually separates decision making and expectation formation
and requires subjects to form expectations only, while the decision problem
is solved by the computer (see Marimon et al. 1993). We argue that it is a
more natural setting if subjects both have to think about the consequences of
their decisions and form expectations not for its own sake but with the goal
of making good decisions.
2M o d e l
Our model economy consists of a labor market and a product market. The
labor market determines the nominal wage and the level of employment and
the product market determines the prices of goods. Production is directly
linked to employment via the production function. The economy consists of
three identical industries, each producing a good for which there is a deter-
ministic demand function. In each industry, there are only two agents: a
monopoly union and a monopoly  rm. In a sequential two stage game,  rst
the union sets the nominal wage and the  rm subsequently chooses the level of
employment for the given wage. In the following, we  rst describe the model
in detail. The next section presents the implementation in the laboratory.
6In the  rst stage, in each industry , a representative worker or union sets










which is a function of the real wage, 
 , and employment 	 Since  is
increasing in the level of employment, it can be interpreted as a utility function
of a union that cares for the employment status of its members. The marginal
utility of employment is positive, but decreasing. The additive separability of
the arguments ensures that the utility function has an inner maximum for the
given production function and the product demand function2.  is a scaling
factor and  is the weight given to employment.
Next, the  rm learns the wage level in the respective industry and deter-
mines the industry employment. The pro ts of  rm  are given by

 =    	 (2)
Output  is a function of productivity 
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Since  depends on the actions of all workers and  rms, it is an aggregate
variable.
The economy is fully characterized by the equations (1) - (5). As a theoret-
ical benchmark, we derive the equilibrium nominal wage and the equilibrium
employment level for homogeneous  rms and workers under the assumptions
of full information and strict maximization of pro ts and utility. To deter-
mine the equilibrium under these assumptions and to do comparative statics
2This function may not be the standard utility function in union models, but it confronts
workers with the intended trade-o  between the real wage and the employment level.
7on the equilibrium is the standard textbook approach in economic analysis.
The  rst order condition for fully informed pro t maximizing monopolistic
 rms requires to equate the real producer wage with the markup times the















Using the production function and the demand function, we derive labor





























Substituting (7) and (8) into (1) and taking the derivative with respect to

























which is, of course, constant.
3 Experimental design and procedure
The main objective of the experiment is to observe what subjects do in the
economy characterized by equations (2) - (5) and to learn how the perceive
the model.
Obviously, in real world markets full information is a way too strong as-
sumption, since this would mean perfect knowledge of all functional forms
and parameters. The assumption that  rms can exactly deduce the price
for a given level of supply is maybe the most unrealistic feature of the full
information model.
In order to introduce an element of uncertainty and to require subjects
to form beliefs about the model and expectations about the consequences of
their actions, we therefore gave subjects only the rudimentary information of
8a negative relationship between the output and the price in each industry, but
did not inform them neither about the parameters nor the functional form
of the demand function. Otherwise, to  nd the equilibrium would only be a
matter of computations.
Equations (2), (3), (1), and (5) were equal for all industries and known to
subjects. It was also common knowledge that everybody had this information.
In addition to the uncertainty about the model, workers also faced uncertainty
about the behavior of  rms and consequently about  and , when setting the
nominal wages. While the relationship between  and  is relatively easy to
learn, the relation between  and  is complex and intransparent. It appears
plausible that real unions only have a limited understanding how their wage
setting behavior acts on the general price level.
The experiment was implemented computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher
2007) with networked PCs separated by blinds. Participants were 36 stu-
dents from di erent departments of the University of Innsbruck. Upon arrival
in the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to their role as worker or  rm
and to the economy with  xed assignments throughout the whole experiment
(partner design). Instructions (see Appendix) were read aloud and partic-
ipants were given the opportunity to ask questions before the start of the
experiment. During the training phase, participants could check with a test
program whether they had understood how their payo s would be calculated.
A session consisted of 30 rounds or periods with three stages in each round.
In the  rst stage, workers had to chose a nominal wage for the current period
from the interval [0, 3]. To assist the wage setting decision, workers could use
a utility calculator that displayed the hypothetical value of the utility function
for the nominal wage , and hyothetical employment and price levels  and
 the subject had entered. Subjects were free to recalculate their utility as
often as they wished within the given time limit of 90 seconds. The entered
wage level was then actively con rmed by the subjects. Simultaneously to
the wage decision of the workers, each  rm had to enter a wage expectation
for the current round.
In the second stage  rms had to decide, how much labor to employ (from
the interval [0.5, 16]) and to state and expectation for their commodity price.
Analogous to workers,  rms could use a pro t calculator that displayed the
hypothetical pro t for any combination of employment and expected price.
While  rms were making their decision on employment, workers were re-
quested to enter the expectation for the price level  and for the level of
9employment in their industry. The second stage also lasted 90 second.
In the  nal stage, all subjects learned the realizations of   and  in
their industry in the current round. They were also informed about  the
value of their objective function 
 or , the expectations they had entered,
and the payo  for their expectation3. All subjects were asked if they would
like to buy information to be displayed in the  rst two stages of the next round.
If they chose to buy no information, only the previous round’s realizations
of   and  in their industry,  and the value of their own objective
function were displayed. From the second period onward, this information
was automatically displayed on the top of the  rst two stages’ screens. In
addition to this information, they could opt to buy time-series information,
cross-section information, or both. The price of either the time series or the
cross-section was 0.1 "Taler" (the experimental currency unit, in which both
pro ts and utility was measured). The price for information was very low
and served mainly as a threshold to deter subjects from constantly requesting
all available information. In case of the time-series option, they obtained not
only the realizations of the variables in the industry of the previous period,
but of all previous periods. If they decided for the cross-section, they were
shown the realization of all variables in the previous round in all industries.
Subjects’ payo s in euros were calculated based on total pro ts or utility
cumulated (both in "Taler") over all periods and earnings from good expec-
tations (also in "Taler"). Earnings from expectations were determined by

 =m a x ( 1  	5(   	






 =m a x ( 1  	5(   	
)2   	5(   	
)0) (11)
for  rms in each period. Forecast earnings were also cumulated over all rounds
and added to total pro t (utility).
We conducted 2 sessions with of about 2.5 hours each with three economies
in each session and with an average remuneration of 30 per participant
including a 5 s h o w - u pp a y m e n t . I ne a c hs e s s i o n ,w ep a i do u tt h e  x e d
sum of 540 to be divided conditional on experimental performance. After
subtracting 90 paid for the show-up, the remaining 450 were divided by
the total number of "Taler" earned to determine the conversion of "Taler"
3We explain below, how expectations were incentivized.
10to euros. Subjects received their payo s private and in cash directly after
the experiment. The payo  scheme was common knowledge and explained in
detail before the experiment.
4R e s u l t s f o r   r m s
We present the results for subjects in the role of  rms in this section and
those for workers in the next section. In both sections, we  rst analyze the
descriptive power of the full information model, move on to the perceived
product demand function of  rms and the perceived model of workers, and
 nally examine if subjects maximize their objective functions.
4.1 Full information
We start our analysis with an examination of the as-if -assumption. Do the
subjects in our experiment behave as if they were perfectly informed and
perfectly rational? Assume that all agents ( rms) have complete information
and are perfectly rational. Then the model predicts the  rms to choose the
pro t maximizing full information employment level according to (7) for any
wage  set by the workers. With our parametrization of 
 =8 =1  and
 =4 , equation (7) yields








5   2	524 and 1 =  1	6	 This prediction can be tested by
estimating
ln = b 0 + b 1 ln +  (13)
for all subjects  and comparing estimates b 0 and b 1 with the theoretical
values 0 and 1	 We  nd the model to  t the data remarkably good4 (see
Table 8). For 8 subjects, the adjusted 2 is at least 0.8 and only for 3 subjects5
it does not exceed 0.1. The good  t is fairly surprising, because the demand
function is non-linear and if anything one might expect subjects to assume
linear functions if the functional form of a relationship is unknown.
In 12 cases, the estimated wage elasticity of employment, b 1, is not sig-
ni cantly di erent from the model prediction, 1 =  1	6	 Among the six
remaining cases, for which the elasticity di ers signi cantly from the predic-
4We skipped the  rst 3 observations to control for learning and adjustment e ects. For
subject 16 in session 1 and subject 8 in session, we get remarkably better estimates, if we
skip observation 4. The behavior of subject 6 in session becomes stable from period 10
onward.
5Subject 16 in session 2 is a special case, because this person chose a constant employment
level from period 5 until the end.
11tion, are the three subjects, for whom the model does not  t (according to
the low 2). The estimated intercept, b 0 is di erent from 0 in the majority
of cases. The point estimates are systematically too large6 (between 26% and
73%). With the exception of subject 16 in session 2, it is never signi cantly
too low. These results show that subjects generally chose employment levels
that are higher than optimal, but respond to changes in the wage as predicted
by the theoretical full information model.
Table 1 contains the results of panel estimations of (13), that summarize
the results of the individual estimations7. Regardless of which panel model
we estimate, the general message is the same: on average the scaling factor
b 0 is too large, but the wage elasticity of labor demand is very close to the
theoretical value. Only in two cases, the estimated elasticity di ers signi -
cantly from -1.6, but in column (3) the 5% level is almost reached and the
p o o l e dO L Se s t i m a t i o ni n( 9 )i sc l e a r l yi n f e r i o rt ot h e  x e de   e c t sm o d e li n
(11).
Another way to analyze the predictive power of the full information model
for behavior of subjects is to estimate
 = 0 + 1


 +  (14)
which is the standard approach to test if a prediction is unbiased. If the
model were a perfect description of the observed behavior, b 0 =0  and
b 1 =1would hold. F-tests on the joint restriction on the two parameters
always reject the null with the exception of subject 18 in session 1. In a
strict sense, the experimental evidence rejects the full information model as
a reliable predictor of agents’ behavior. However, in 8 cases, a t-test on the
restriction b 1 =1alone cannot reject the null at the  ve percent level. Table 2
presents the panel estimations of (14). Again we  nd actual employment to be
larger than the optimal one. In all panel estimations, b 1 is clearly larger than




  is always 1 indicating
that the full information model fails to predict the level of employment that
is chosen, but successfully predicts the change.
6ln(2.524) = .926.
7In the panel estimations, the four subjects S1-10, S2-6, S2-14, and S2-16 are excluded.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Table 3: Mean deviations of optimum employment










21 . 0 4    -.16   .64   -.06  
4. 7 3    -.11   .19   -.01  
6. 3 2    -.03   .82   -.11  
8. 5 5    -.11   .46   -.03  
10 2.24   -.47   .56   -.05  
12 .43   -.05   .59   -.05  
14 .27   -.02   1.29   -.28 
16 .58   -.05   1.79   -.51
18 .25  -.06   .85   -.11  
all .71   -.12   .99   -.22  
Notes: periods 4 to 30, [*,**] di erent from theoretical value at [5 %, 1 %]
This is also visible in Figure 1 and Figure 2, which show the predicted
employment levels based on the estimation of (13) and the full information
optimal employment as functions of the wage rate. For both sessions, the
 tted curves lie above the theoretical ones, but their shapes are very similar.
We found that subjects systematically chose too high employment levels.
But how costly is this deviation from the optimal employment level? Table
3 presents the percentage deviations of employment and pro ts from their


















While employment deviates considerably from its optimum (on average
71% in session 1 and 99% in session 2), the forgone pro ts are moderate. In
session 1, subject 10 incurs largest loss with 47% relative to the full infor-
mation pro ts. The largest loss of 51% in session 2 accrues to subject 16
who simply set a constant employment level after period 4. The three sub-
jects with the largest pro t deviations are those with the worst  t of equation
(13). 10 subjects have very low forgone pro ts of 6% or lower although all
of them chose employment by more than 19% too high. For them, either
the estimated coe cients are not signi cantly di erent from their theoretical
values or the too high b 0 is counterbalanced by a b 1 which is signi cantly






















Figure 2: Actual and optimal employment, session 2
16We conclude that in general the full information model with perfectly
rational agents describes the behavior of the subjects in the role of  rms in
our experiment surprisingly well. Although all subjects set employment above
its optimal level, the resulting losses are relatively small. The full information
model does not do a good job predicting the level of employment, but it makes
fairly accurate predictions of employment changes in response to changes of
the nominal wage.
4.2 Perceived demand function
If subjects in the role of  rms knew the demand function, their decision prob-
lem would be relatively straightforward. Given the production function, they
could compute output as a function of any level of employment and plug this
into the demand function to get the price. Using the pro t calculator they
could determine the optimal employment level. Subjects should hence have a
strong incentive to learn the demand function.





We estimate the log of (17) with the expected price 	 instead of the
actual price  and test for b %0 =l n  =0and b %1 =  1
 =  	25	 We also
perform the Ramsey RESET test for misspeci cation or omitted variables
and MacKinnon-White-Davidson PE test for a log-log model against a linear
model and vice versa8. A perceived linear demand function appears a natural
assumption if the true functional form is not known. In contrast to the previ-
ous subsection, it is interesting to focus here on the individual results rather
than the aggregate results for the whole panel. Though theoretical macro-
economic models are used to explain and to predict aggregate behavior, we
examine the individual perceptions next.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Only the subjects9 S1-12, S1-14, S1-18, and S2-14 perceive a demand
function that does not di er signi cantly from the true one (see Table 4). For
all other subjects, either the F-test rejects that the parameters are equal to
the true ones or the RESET test rejects the speci cation. In most cases, the
log-log form is not favored against the linear model by the PE test, but the
reverse is also true.
Interestingly, the pooled regressions without the subjects for whom the
models obviously does not  t10 deliver parameter estimates, which are very
close to the theoretical ones. This means that the aggregate perception of
the demand function is correct event though individual perceptions might
be fairly di erent. In Figure 3, the estimated demand function using the
expected prices is practically indistinguishable from the true demand function.
Apart from some subjects that have very wrong perceptions and some obvious
outliers11, subjects did not misperceive the demand function systematically.
In the aggregate, individual misperceptions about the demand function cancel
out.
4.3 Pro t maximization
We have demonstrated that the comparative statics of the full information
model predict well how subjects in the role of  rms change their labor demand,
although individual subjects do not have a correct perception of the product
demand function. It is interesting that actual pro ts in several cases are
not much smaller than the maximal ones despite the misperceived demand
functions. Full pro t maximizing behavior implies to consider that the choice
of employment has an impact on the product price, since every  rm is a
monopolist. Obviously, this is di cult if  rms perceive their demand functions
incorrectly. We therefore can rule out fully rational behavior. But subjects
might be boundedly (restrictedly) rational in the sense that they take the
price expectation as given and choose the employment level that maximizes
pro ts for that price expectation which is what price takers would do. To  nd
the pro t maximizing employment for a given price expectation was easy in
the experiment, because the experimental program o ered a pro t calculator
to  rms that calculated the hypothetical pro t for any combination of the
expected price and the employment choice subjects had entered.
9Sx-y means subject y in session x.
10Subjects S1-4, S2-2, S2-6, S2-12, and S2-16.
11In several cases, subjects entered a price expectation of about 55. This seems to be an
obvious typing error, because often the actual price was about 0.55. We excluded all price
expectations larger than 1

















Most subjects used the pro t calculator regularly. Only subject S1-10
never used the calculator and S2-6, S2-12, S2-14 used it less than 25 times.
The calculator saves the last pro t calculation for the expected price and the
employment level the subject has entered. Comparing the hypothetical pro t
saved by the calculator with the expected pro t resulting from the actual
employment choice and the expected price, we  nd rather high correlations
(at least .9 in 13 cases). In most cases, subjects entered the price expectation
and the employment level, for which they had made the last pro t calculation.
This suggests that they experimented with di erent levels of employment for
a given price expectation until the pro t calculator delivered hypothetical
pro ts that seemed reasonable to the subjects. Given this evidence, we con-
clude that most subjects tried to  nd the pro t maximizing employment level
for the given price expectation. They expected to receive the pro t that they
had calculated.
How successful were they in  nding the pro t maximizing employment
level for the given price expectation? In Table 5 we compare the mean em-
ployment level chosen with the optimal one and the resulting pro ts. Pro t
maximizing  rms must chose the level of employment for a given nominal











Only  ve subjects chose employment such that its mean di ers signi cantly
(at p=.05) from the mean of the pro t maximizing employment path for given
expectations and only in four cases are mean pro ts signi cantly di erent.
The chosen employment path of several subjects (S1-6, S1-8, S1-10, S1-14,
S1-18, S2-4, S2-14) is more strongly correlated with the optimal path than
with the one of maximizing price takers, suggesting that the full information
model is a better predictor of their behavior.
A pooled OLS regression and a random e ects regression of actual em-
ployment on 
shows that in the aggregate subjects maximize pro ts
for expected prices12. The pooled OLS regression has an 2 of 0.5 and the
hypothesis that both the intercept equals zero and the slope coe cient (0.98)
equals one is only rejected at p=0.0495. The preferable RE model cannot
reject the joint hypothesis (p=.19) and has a slope coe cient of 0.93. For all
subjects, pro t maximization for given price expectations is a good model.
At least in a statistical sense, especially in session 2, many subjects appear
to maximize pro ts for given price expectations. However, the comparison of
means and the estimation of the panel model hide in some cases consider-
able deviations from the pro t maximizing employment levels. We de ne the
following pro t measures:

 = ()    (19)














)   
 (23)
(19) is simply the actual pro t earned in each period, (20) is the hypothet-
ical pro t for the given price expectation and the actually chosen employment
, (21) is the maximum pro t for the expected price, (22) would be actually
12We excluded S1-8 from the estimations because of very strange behavior in the last 5
periods. This subject did almost perfectly the opposite of what pro t maximization for
given expected prices demanded. The  xed e ects are statistically di erent form zero. The
Hausman test does not reject random e ects. The Breusch-Pagan test also indicates random
e ects.
21Table 5: Mean deviations of optimum employment and pro t








2 actual 4.59 3.10 2.23 3.09
given p 3.19 3.16 .94 2.24 3.29 .88
full information 2.28  3.69 .95 1.34   3.30   .85
4 actual 2.58 3.04 .55 2.21
given p 2.36 3.19 .88 .80   2.30  .23
full information 1.47   3.37  .77 .47   2.23 .51
6 actual 1.70 3.15 2.76 .63
given p 2.19   3.28 .75 1.47 2.67 -.22
full information 1.30   3.24 .80 .93   2.86  -.08
8 actual 4.60 3.74 2.09 3.25
given p 6.14 4.35 .57 2.35   3.36 .92
full information 3.40 4.21 .78 1.42   3.38 .88
10 actual 2.18 1.41 2.79 3.50
given p .98   2.12   .15 3.04 3.77   .97
full information .72   2.60   .24 1.78   3.68   .97
12 actual 1.29 2.60 1.51 2.76
given p 1.40 2.57 .95 1.54 2.83 .95
full information .88 2.72 .96 .94   2.90   .86
14 actual 1.20 2.84 4.19 3.07
given p 1.58   2.91 .64 3.47 3.69 .26
full information .95   2.90 .68 2.17   3.91  .40
16 actual 1.22 2.58 2.00 2.78
given p 1.26 2.60 .77 1.92 3.00 .
full information .78   2.71   .71 1.19   3.14 .
18 actual 1.41 2.83 2.80 3.06
given p 2.05 3.30  .35 2.52 3.27 .94
full information 1.13 3.03 .71 1.55   3.40  .93
Notes:(() bivariate correlation of  with 
 or 
 [*,**] signi -
cantly di erent actual value at [5%, 1%]
22earned by a subject optimizing to a given price expectations, and (23) is the
full information pro t.
We can use these pro t de nitions to measure how strongly subjects de-
viate from rational behavior. The previous analysis has shown that most
subjects deviate signi cantly from the full information prediction. We have
argued before that the mean pro t loss is relatively small. Using the sum13
of deviations of actual from full information pro ts,
P
(




 ),w es e ei n
Table 6 that foregone pro ts are sizeable for a number of subjects.
But this benchmark may be too demanding, since the full information
solution might be di cult to  nd for the participants even if all information
were available. The pro t maximum for given price expectations might be
a more realistic benchmark for the subjects’ rationality. Subjects can easily
 nd the optimal employment level by entering di erent values for employment






 ) measures how much actual total pro ts di er from the pro ts
a subject would have received if he had chosen the optimal employment for his
expected price. These losses usually di er from the losses relative to the full
information solution and some subjects (S1-16, S2-2, S2-8, S2-10, S2-12) are
very close to the partial pro t maximum. The partial maximum pro ts are
in most cases smaller than the full information pro ts, but in some cases they
are higher due to the large deviation of the expected from the actual prices.
The losses relative to the partial maximum can be decomposed in losses due










































   


 ) is avoidable, as it results from
deviations of employment from the optimal level, which subjects could have
determined using the pro t calculator. It is an ex ante loss, because it is
calculated on the basis of the expected price, and hence unrelated to the
13In all analyses using these pro ts measures, we exclude the  rst three periods as a
learning phase. Furthermore, we exclude the periods, in which some subjects had entered
price expectations  1 which are clear outliers.
23expectation error. In session 1, these losses are large for subjects 2, 8, 10,
and 18, and in session 2 for 6, 14, and 16. Among these subjects, the means
between actual employment and optimal employment were only signi cantly
di erent for subject S1-10, who never used the pro t calculator. According
to the data, at least 7 out of 18 subjects did not maximize pro ts for their
expected price and incurred considerable losses that they could have avoided
by using the calculator.










   
	
) is the di erence between realized and expected pro ts for
the actual employment decision. Obviously, if the employment choice were





)	 In most cases, the
total expectation error losses are very close to zero (S1-4, S1-10, S1-12, S1-14,
S1-16, S2-2, S2-4, S2-8, S2-10, S2-12, S2-16, S2-18), which means that the
foregone pro ts result to the largest part from subjects’ failure to optimize.
In three cases (S1-2, S1-18, S2-14), the optimization loss was partially o set




   
	
) result from systematic underpredictions of the actual
price and strongly negative values from large overpredictions.
Examining the correlation between the random e ects estimated for the
complete sample (except for subject S1-8) and the measures of foregone prof-
its, we  nd the random e ects (column (7)) to be practically unrelated to

   
	 (( = 	05) and 

  
 (( =  0	21), which are the losses due
to price expectation errors. The random e ects are strongly correlated with

   

 (( =  0	77), 
	   

(( =  0	61) and 
   
 (( =  0	59)
con rming that systematic deviations from the optimal employment (opti-
mization errors) are responsible for the bulk of the losses. A simple regression
of the optimization losses on the random e ects shows that losses are larger
if employment is too high than if it is too low, which is reasonable, given the
positive correlation between the losses and the random e ects.
5R e s u l t s f o r w o r k e r s
We examine subjects’ behavior with respect to the same research questions: Is
their behavior predicted by the full information model? How do they perceive
the model? Do they behave consistently to their perceptions?
While we can analyze these questions in a similar way as before, there are
important di erences that make the analysis more di cult. The optimization
24Table 6: Foregone pro ts
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S1-2 80.67 -15.37 -5.19 -7.14 5.76 -3.81 1.16
S1-4 79.20 -8.55 -1.78 -1.83 -1.99 2.04 .07
S1-6 85.19 -2.29 -2.36 -2.26 -1.13 1.03 -.56
S1-8 97.35 -12.14 -17.79 -14.5 -1.13 -2.15 .
S1-10 32.45 -27.40 -15.87 -15.70 -.58 .42 .82
S1-12 70.10 -3.37 -1.95 -1.77 2.36 -2.54 -.27
S1-14 76.79 -1.49 -2.18 -1.95 .11 -.34 -.50
S1-16 69.68 -3.44 -.21 -.14 -.54 .47 -.22
S1-18 76.53 -5.18 -9.75 -11.42 -1.09 2.76 -.70
S2-2 80.27 -5.54 -.40 -.33 -4.95 4.88 -.14
S2-4 59.79 -.51 -1.92 -2.02 -.21 .31 -.43
S2-6 17.09 -60.10 -52.33 -46.83 -8.28 2.78 .95
S2-8 87.77 -3.44 -.42 -.39 -2.46 2.43 -.34
S2-10 84.06 -4.17 .10 -.19 -6.14 6.44 -.29
S2-12 74.39 -4.04 -.04 -.03 -2.08 2.08 -.20
S2-14 82.78 -22.66 -13.64 -15.33 -1.45 3.14 .58
S2-16 58.55 -7.49 -3.40 -3.36 -1.13 1.09 -.07
S2-18 82.54 -9.35 -1.87 -2.00 -3.84 3.97 .14
Notes:  3 and 	 ' 1 estimated random e ects
25task is more complicated in that the optimal wage choice depends on the
expected behavior of all other subjects in their group. The employment level
is determined by the  rm player in their industry and the price level depends
on the employment choice in all industries, which are, in turn, functions of
the other wages. In contrast to the analysis of the  rms’ behavior, there is no
theoretical benchmark for the workers’ optimal behavior. Workers’ decisions
are more di cult both ex ante for subjects and ex post for us to examine.
5.1 Full information
In the full information model, the utility maximizing wage is constant, because
there are no dynamics or stochastic shocks. From equations (2) - (5) 
 =
0	5235 follows to be the utility maximizing wage only if all  rms maximize
pro ts for this given wage. If  rms choose employment levels that are higher
than optimal, the utility maximizing wage is also higher. In the extreme case
that  rms do no respond to wage changes, the optimal strategy is the maximal
wage of 3.
All of the workers chose a wage whose mean over all 30 periods was sta-
tistically di erent from 
	 But as subjects did not have full information, we
cannot expect them to set the optimal wage right from the start. They might
have been able to  nd the optimal wage during the course of the experiment.
In that case, we should observe convergence of the wage to its optimal level.
Table 7 presents the mean and the standard deviation of  for     20 and
 20	
The wages of eight subjects converge in the last part of the experiment
as measured by the standard deviation (lower than .1 and signi cantly lower
than in the  rst part). However, only the wage of subject S1-7 converges to
the optimal level, all other wages are signi cantly too high. For the majority
of subjects, we do not even  nd convergence to some stable wage. The stan-
dard deviation for four subjects is even increasing in the second phase of the
experiment.
Given this evidence, the full information model is not suited to predict
subjects’ behavior. Not only does the wage generally converge to di erent
levels than predicted; for the majority of subjects, the wage does not converge
at all to any constant level.
5.2 Perceived model
The model has two components that are important for the workers’ decision
problem. First, workers must form some perception of the labor demand
26Table 7: Means and standard deviations of nominal wages
Session 1 Session 2
 ) ()  ) ()
S1     20 1.93   .39 1.76   .59
 20 .85  †† .30 1.62   .49
S3     20 1.62   .43 2.93   .14
 20 1.38   .59 2.82   .20
S5     20 1.71   .44 2.08   .53
 20 1.62   .32 1.66  †† .13††
S7     20 2.02   .74 1.74   .52
 20 .52†† .06†† 1.32  †† .02††
S9     20 1.98   .13 1.47   .26
 20 2.67  †† .25†† 1.13  †† .08††
S11     20 2.65   .29 2.02   .40
 20 1.69  †† .71†† 1.83  † 0††
S13     20 1.97   .38 1.31   .39
 20 1.82  † .03†† 1.20   .63†
S15     20 2.23   .34 2.17   .74
 20 2.05  † .03†† 1.51  †† .07††
S17     20 1.93   .16 1.53   .57
 20 1.73   .79†† 1.60   0††
Notes: [*,**] signi cantly di erent from theoretical value at [5%, 1%], [†,††]
signi cantly di erent from value in     20 at [5%, 1%], bold numbers indicate
convergence
27function and s econd, they need some idea of how their wages in uence the
price level. The labor demand function is relatively easy to learn, as it only
depends on the actions of one other player. The relationship between one
worker’s wage and the price level, is more complicated.
Table 8 contains the parameter estimates from an estimation of
ln	
 = b 0 + b 1 ln +  (26)
and the p-values of an F-test on the equality of the estimated coe cients with
their counterparts from the actual labor demand functions (columns (1) and
(2)) and the p-value of the RESET test. The perceived labor demand function
of four workers (S1-9, S1-15, S2-5, S2-9) cannot be described by equation
(26), given the 2 of the regressions . For six additional workers (S1-5, S1-
11, S2-7, S2-11, S2-13, S2-17) the model  t is acceptable, but the RESET
tests indicate either the wrong functional form or omitted variables. Eight
perceived labor demand functions display a reasonable  t and are not rejected
by the RESET test. Among these, two (S1-1 and S1-7) have a remarkably
good  t and appear not to be statistically di erent from the actual labor
demand functions. The estimates of six further perceived demand functions
do not di er from the true ones, but only one of these estimations passes the
RESET test. Contrary to the  rms, workers do not perceive the actual labor
demand function correctly in the aggregate, as the pooled OLS estimations
show. In both session, the coe cients of the actual labor demand function
and the coe cients of the perceived one di er signi cantly. Summing up, we
conclude that most workers perceive a labor demand function that is close to
the actual one, but only two subjects have correct perceptions. Aggregation
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9The second key element of workers’ perceived model is the relation be-
tween the nominal wage  and the general price level 	 As said before, this
relationship is less direct than the one between the nominal wage and em-
ployment, which can be seen in Table 11. In eight cases (S1-5, S1-13, S1-15,
S2-1, S2-3, S2-5, S2-13, S2-15), there is basically no systematic in uence of
the nominal wage on . Interestingly, in most of the remaining cases, the
estimated relationships are very similar with b *0 between -.57 and -.70 and
b *1 between .06 and .14. An increase of the wage by 10 percent led to an
increase of the price level of about 1 percent. Of the eight systematic rela-
tionships between wages and the price level, only three are correctly perceived
by workers (S1-1, S1-3, S1-17)14. This is clear evidence that most subjects
do not perceive the impact of their wage setting behavior on the price level
correctly. However, in the aggregate there is no signi cant di erence between
the estimated coe cients, so that individual errors cancel out. But notice
that the 2 for estimation of workers’ perceived relationship is very low.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We hardly observe any convergence of nominal wages, if anything the constant
value di ers from the optimal full information wage. If wages reach a more
or less constant level after several periods they are also not optimal for the
implied perceived models with parameter estimates for 	 = *01 and 	 =







not chosen by any of our participants in the last third of the experiment (see
Table 10, columns (1) and (3)).
The price level is determined by the actions of many agents, that are
potentially di cult to predict. We have shown that in many cases it is only
weakly related to individual wages and that, even if it is, subjects rarely detect
this relationship. Since subjects knew that their employment level was chosen
by the  rm player in their industry, learning might have been concentrated
on their counterparts’ reactions to their wages and largely ignored the more
complex impact on the price level. Such a perception of the market would
imply to choose the wage that maximizes the utility function for a given
















But, as Table 10 shows, subjects’ behavior cannot be described by the
assumptions leading to 
	 The mean wage is always statistically di erent
from the optimal wage15 and except for subject S2-11, the correlation between
 and 
is very low or even negative. Many workers seem to have
underestimated the employment responses to their wages, resulting in optimal
wages higher than the possible maximum of 3. Nevertheless, most wages were
signi cantly smaller than 3, which means that those subjects did not choose
the wage consistent with their expectations.
The bounded rationality version of the model also fails to describe what
subjects in the role of workers did in the experiment. Subject did neither
choose utility maximizing wages that considered both the e ect on the price
level and employment nor did they chose utility maximizing wages for given
price level expectations and perceived labor demand functions.
As with the  rm players, this behavior led to considerable ex ante utility
losses due to the optimization failure (see column (6)). These losses, which
15In several cases, the optimal wage was larger than 3.
32are measured in the same unit of account as the foregone pro ts, are much
larger than those of  rms. However, the optimization problem of workers is
more di cult than that of  rms. For a given wage,  rms only had to form
expectations on the demand function in order to maximize their pro ts. This
makes it easy to  nd the pro t maximizing employment for the given price
expectation. Workers, however, needed to form expectations both on the
price level and on the employment level. Bot depended on the chosen wage
in a non-deterministic way in contrast to the price for  rms, which was a
deterministic function of employment. The large ex ante utility losses are
hence not surprising. As every concept of optimal wage depends on estimates
of expected or real behavior of  rms, all measures of optimal wages are sub-
ject to considerable estimation errors. We therefore abstain from utility loss
decompositions analogous to the decompositions of foregone pro ts.
6 Conclusions
Our experiment provides a unique opportunity to study the economic behavior
of subjects in a simple macroeconomic environment and their perceptions
of this environment. Separately and in comparison, we can assess whether
subjects behave consistently with the expectations they form, and if failure
to optimize stems from misperception or misbehavior.
We  nd that the predictive capacity of our textbook-like model is limited.
For  rms, the model’s predictive performance is fair. Although  rms employ
systematically too much labor, the observed elasticity of labor demand to
the nominal wage is exactly as predicted by the model. Not only does the
model predict the direction of change directly, but also the size, given the
deviation in levels. The model clearly fails to predict, what workers do. Only
8 out of 18 workers set a more or less constant wage in the last phase of the
experiment, but only in one case this wage is not signi cantly di erent from
the theoretical optimum.
Whether subjects behave as the model predicts or not, may depend on
their ability to perceive the model correctly and their optimization skills.
While most individual  rms misperceive the unknown demand function, in
the aggregate the model predictions  ts the observations, which means that
individual biases are not correlated. The individual errors cancel out, just as
generally argued in the theoretical literature. The same is true for workers’
perceptions of the relationship between their wage and the price level. In the
aggregate the perception is correct, while individual perceptions are wrong.
33Table 10: Actual and optimal wages, foregone utility









)   (
)
S1-1 .85 2.29   1.70   -.62 119.20 -31.90
(.10) (.09) (0)
S1-3 1.38 3   3   . 79.03 -264.71
(.19) (0) (0)
S1-5 1.62 3   3   . 35.57 -247.28
(.10) (0) (0)
S1-7 .52 2.09   1.69   -.34 -40.52 -39.80
(.02) (.08) (0)
S1-9 2.67 3   3   . 309.54 -170.75
(.08) (0) (0)
S1-11 1.69 2.44  2.21  -.41 -80.94 -18.40
(.22) (.22) (0)
S1-13 1.82 3   3   . -52.67 -61.95
(.01) (0) (0)
S1-15 2.05 3   3   . 32.12 -183.03
(.01) (0) (0)
S1-17 1.73 3   3   . -176.07 -67.34
(.25) (0) (0)
S2-1 1.62 3   3   . 70.65 -108.42
(.15) (0) (0)
S2-3 2.82 1.07   .99   -.32 -312.18 -311.05
(.06) (.01) (0)
S2-5 1.66 3   3   . 84.87 -287.12
(.04) (0) (0)
S2-7 1.32 3   3   . 98.00 -214.55
(.01) (0) (0)
S2-9 1.13 3   3   . 111.01 -246.38
(.02) (0) (0)
S2-11 1.83 1.35   3   .74 95.25 -12.33
(0) (0) (0)
S2-13 1.20 3   3   . 158.25 -269.73
(0.20) (0) (0)
S2-15 1.51 3   3   . 210.97 -395.80
(0.02) (0) (0)
S2-17 1.6 2.09   1.57   .12 146.29 -21.05
(0) (0.01) (0)
Notes: [*,**] signi cantly di erent from actual value at [5%, 1%],  3
34The strength of the labor demand response to the nominal wage is gener-
ally underestimated by workers, both on the individual and on the aggregate
level. Nevertheless, workers’ perceptions of the labor demand functions are
not too unrealistic, which suggests that in our experiment, misperceptions of
the model economy may not be the main reason why the theoretical predic-
tions and the observed behavior do not always coincide.
Both workers and  rms do not optimize for given expectations, which is,
at least for  rms, the major reason why their behavior di ers from the the-
oretical prediction. While virtually all workers failed to set wages consistent
with their price level expectations, only 5 of the 18  rms chose an employ-
ment level which was statistically di erent from the one which was optimal
for given expectations. But this statistical similarity hides that many  rm
players incurred foreseeable pro t losses due to optimization failure, although
optimization for given expectations was very easy, since they had pro t calcu-
lator at their disposal. They did, of course, also forego pro ts, because they
did not realize to have market power an set monopoly prices. Given that
several  rms did perceive the unknown demand function fairly correctly, the
case for imperfect optimization is even stronger. Kirchkamp and Reiß (2007)
 nd a very similar result in a completely di erent experimental setup.
Though  rms were not always successful in their attempt to maximize
pro ts, they obviously tried do so, even if only in a restricted sense, as they
did not exploit their price-setting power. The strategies of the workers, on
the other hand, remain obscure after the analysis performed in this paper. It
might be an enlightening exercise to examine their behavior more closely and
t o  n do u ti fi ti sp o s s i b l et od e s c r i b ei tb ys i m p l eh e u r i s t i c so rb e h a v i o r a l
models. Workers’ behavior is particularly interesting, because they face more
model uncertainty than  rms. Another question this paper cannot answer is
the robustness of our result that subjects do not optimize within an economic
framework, although their perception of it is fairly accurate. We believe that
much more work on the relation between beliefs and optimizing behavior in
di erent setups is necessary, before the usefulness of the as-if-approach based
on perfect information and maximizing behavior can be assessed.
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